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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
David Charles Anderson appeals from the

district court’s denial

of his motion t0 suppress

evidence.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

The underlying

facts,

found by the

district court at the

suppression hearing, are as

follows:

On

October

11th,

2018, the defendant [Anderson] was seated in his vehicle in a

parking area near a bus stop in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, located near Riverstone and
Seltice

Way.

At

the same time and location, Ofﬁcer Herbig, in his capacity as a patrol ofﬁcer
with the Coeur d’Alene Police Department, was in that same parking area.

Ofﬁcer Herbig had parked his vehicle, his patrol vehicle With all the lights and
spotlights and things well away from the defendant’s vehicle. His vehicle in n0
infringed upon the defendant’s ability to move his vehicle forward or
backward 0r simply drive away. There was n0 restriction of the defendant’s
vehicle by the police vehicle operated by Ofﬁcer Herbig.

way

Ofﬁcer Herbig, again, referring to the [ofﬁcer Video admitted into evidence], had
checked out a vehicle that had been parked there. Used his ﬂashlight t0 100k
inside t0 see what there was, if anything, and then returned to his patrol vehicle.
And then got out of his patrol vehicle and walked towards the pickup truck Where
the defendant

He

was

located.

carried his ﬂashlight

Without being requested
in the driver’s side

and walked up
t0[,]

rolled

down the driver’s side
And what ensued

of the vehicle.

The defendant,
Window, he was seated

t0 the defendant’s vehicle.

after that

I

can only

characterize as a friendly conversation.

The tone 0f the ofﬁcer was about as far away from demanding as could possibly
His initial inquiry was simply, how’s it going tonight? And the conversation
then moved forward t0 Where he waS—that the defendant was waiting for his
girlfriend.
She had been to the casino.
Just making casual small talk at that

be.

point.

And

“D0 you have your ID 0n you?” The
ofﬁcer then followed that up with, “Mind if I

then the ofﬁcer, as he testiﬁed, said,

defendant responded “yes,” and the
see it?”

Again, the language that was used

is

important, as

was

the context and the actions

was never an order 0r a
defendant was easily present. He

as part 0f the overall scenario here, because this

command, and the cooperative nature 0f the
handed over the ID and ofﬁcer had it for approximately 30 seconds 0r less. Called
in the name and information, and then very quickly handed it back to the
defendant.

The ofﬁcer at some point, and it wasn’t clear from the Video, but shortly after he
handed that license back or maybe even before got a little bit more information
about the defendant, that he was 0n probation.

And

shortly after he

handed

it

back

to the defendant,

he wanted to conﬁrm

that,

you still on probation? And again, there was a friendly discussion about, you
know, probation, level one. Who’s your probation ofﬁcer? You know, what are
you on probation for? The defendant said meth. They had a little discussion
about, you know, what got the defendant into meth, how long had he been sober.
Did you slam it or did you smoke it. Again, this was all indicative 0f a consensual
conversation between the police ofﬁcer and the defendant.
are

There was never any show of force. There was never any threat of force, there
was never any directions 0r discussions regarding anything up until this point.
The defendant was totally cooperative. At some point in the conversation, Ofﬁcer
Herbig said, okay. If I can check you so I can tell your probation ofﬁcer that
you’re good, not said in the form 0f a command. It was a question.

And

the ofﬁcer said

cooperated
the ofﬁcer
if I

—

state

Anderson moved

And the

p.43, L.17.)

methamphetamine.

The

said sure

and

fully. Got out. Submitted t0 a search, a cursory search for Whatever
was looking for, and then once he ﬁnished that search, he said, “Mind

check your car?”

(TL, p.40, L.16

sure—or the—excuse me, the defendant

defendant said sure.

Ofﬁcer Herbig searched Anderson’s truck and found a baggy of

(T12, p.45, L.4-5.)

charged Anderson With possession 0f a controlled substance.
to suppress evidence, arguing that

Anderson When he took

his

ID and ran

(R., pp.30-31.)

“Ofﬁcer Herbig unlawfully seized Mr.

his information through dispatch

Without any suspicion

that criminal activity

was

afoot.”

(R., p.39.)

Anderson additionally argued

found in Mr. Anderson’s vehicle during a search were a direct
intentional Violation of

poisonous

tree.

Mr. Anderson’s Fourth Amendment

that “[t]he drugs

0f Ofﬁcer Herbig’s

result

and was thus

rights,”

fruit

of the

(R., pp.39-40.)

Following a hearing on Anderson’s motion, the

district court

concluded that the “entire

encounter up until the point that drugs were discovered was a consensual encounter” between

Anderson and Ofﬁcer Herbig. (TL, p.46,
to see

Ls.5-7.)

The court

Anderson’s license was “a reasonable request,” justiﬁed by several legitimate concerns,

and was ultimately “a very de minimis detention 0f

The

additionally found that the request

district court

went on

unreasonable request 0r that

t0

it

ﬁnd

that

it

that driver’s license.”

(T12, p.47, Ls.1-9.)

did not think the request for the license “was an

constituted an unlawful detention because

it

was done with

the

consent 0f the defendant.” (TL, p.48, Ls.1-3.)

The

district court

found that

both person and vehicle

“[t]hereafter, the request to search

were again done by consent,” which Anderson never limited or revoked.
district court

accordingly denied Anderson’s motion to suppress.

Pursuant t0 a conditional plea agreement with the
possession 0f methamphetamine.
district court’s denial

Anderson

to six years

(R., p.61.)

(Tr., p.48,

state,

(R., pp.63-64.)

right to appeal

The

with three years ﬁxed and placed him 0n probation.

Anderson timely appealed.

(R., pp.83-85.)

The

Ls.10-13; R., p.69.)

Anderson pleaded

Anderson reserved the

of his motion t0 suppress.

(Tr., p.48, Ls.4-9.)

district court

guilty to

from the
sentenced

(R., pp.72-73.)

ISSUE
Anderson

Did

states the issue

0n appeal

as:

the district court err in denying Mr. Anderson’s motion t0 suppress,

evidence discovered was the

fruit

Where the

of the ofﬁcer’s suspicionless, unjustiﬁed

detention of Mr. Anderson, and the State failed to establish the applicability 0f

any exception

to the exclusionary rule?

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Anderson

failed t0

show

the district court erred in denying his motion t0 suppress evidence?

ARGUMENT
Anderson
A.

Fails

To Show The

District

Court Erred In Denying His Motion T0 Suppress Evidence

Introduction

Anderson claims

that

suspecting

him of any trafﬁc

the ofﬁcer

walked up

to

“Ofﬁcer Herbig unlawfully detained Mr. Anderson When, Without
Violation or other wrongdoing, or that he

Mr. Anderson

who was

sitting in his

was

in

need of assistance,

parked vehicle, and asked him for

identiﬁcation, took his driver’s license, and then ran the license through police dispatch.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

Anderson thinks

this

was “an unlawful detention”

subsequent consent-based search 0f Anderson’s vehicle, requiring suppression.
This argument
seizure.”

show

fails.

(Id.)

“[R]equesting identiﬁcation does not, Without more, constitute a

State V. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454,

the district court erred

that tainted the

When

it

457 (2004). Thus, Anderson

fails to

concluded that the request to see the license was not “an

unlawful detention” because Anderson “voluntarily consented t0 the driver’s license being

handed

to the officer.” (Tr., p.47, L.23

Moreover, even
an ofﬁcer

may

— p.48,

if the request t0 see the license

was a

detention,

it is

well established that

brieﬂy detain “a driver t0 run a status check on the driver’s license,” even

ofﬁcer’s legitimate reason for making contact

that

L.3.)

would have justiﬁed a detention

“may have

at the outset

not amounted to reasonable suspicion

of the encounter.” State

986, 990-91, 88 P.3d 1226, 1230-31 (Ct. App. 2004).

V.

Landreth, 139 Idaho

Because ofﬁcers can properly detain

drivers “to run a driver’s license check after a legitimate consensual encounter,”

P.3d

at

123 1 Anderson
,

fails t0

show

there

if the

was an unlawful

detention.

Iii.

at

991, 88

B.

Standard

Of Review

In reviewing a decision

0n a motion

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact that are supported

t0 suppress, the appellate court accepts the trial

by

substantial evidence, but freely reviews the

State V. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160

application of constitutional principles t0 those facts.

P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

C.

The

District

Court Correctly Concluded That Anderson

When The Ofﬁcer Requested T0
The Fourth Amendment

to the

Amendment

scrutiny.

“A

Unlawfullv Seized

And Anderson Consented

United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches

and seizures by government ofﬁcials.
Fourth

See His License

Was Not

However, not every police-citizen encounter

seizure under the

triggers

meaning 0f the Fourth Amendment occurs

only ‘when the ofﬁcer, by means 0f physical force or show 0f authority, has in some
restrained the liberty of a citizen.’”

State V. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 612-13, 7 P.3d 219, 221-22

(2000) (quoting Ter_ry V. Ohio, 392 U.S.

“When
seizure, the

way

1,

19 n.16 (1968)).

a defendant seeks to suppress evidence allegedly obtained as a result of an illegal

burden of proving that a seizure occurred

is

on the defendant.”

Idaho 830, 832, 933 P.2d 119, 121 (Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted).
determining whether a seizure occurred
encounter, a reasonable person

is

“whether, under

would have

requests and terminate the encounter.”

felt free t0

all

State V. Fuentes, 129

The proper inquiry

in

the circumstances surrounding the

leave or otherwise decline the ofﬁcer’s

State V. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 653,

978 P.2d 212, 213

(1999) (citing State V. Fuentes, 129 Idaho 830, 832, 933 P.2d 119, 121 (Ct. App. 1997)).

“‘So

long as a reasonable person would feel free t0 disregard the police and go about his business,’ an
encounter between police and an individual

222 (quoting Florida

V.

is

consensual.”

Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)).

m,

134 Idaho

at

613, 7 P.3d at

Applying the above legal principles

to the facts

of

this case, the district court correctly

determined “the entire encounter up until the point the drugs were discovered was a consensual
encounter between” Anderson and Ofﬁcer Herbig.
“obtaining of [Anderson’s] identiﬁcation,” Which

p.46, Ls.3-7.)

(Tr.,

was “consented

t0

Ofﬁcer Herbig did not block Anderson’s vehicle, activate

Ls.1-3.)

his “patrol vehicle’s spotlight.” (TL, p.8, L.20

— p.1 1,

L.2.)

This includes the

by” Anderson.

emergency

his

And Ofﬁcer Herbig

(TL, p.47,

lights, or

did not

use

demand

Anderson’s license, issue an “order 0r a command” for the license, 0r otherwise compel him to
provide

sir?

Could

(Exhibit

give

him

see that?” and

I

1,

02:09-02:12.)

Anderson

said,

that, if

would not have “forced” Anderson

for ofﬁcers t0 simply

“walk away

want

to continue the conversation

The

district

Ofﬁcer Herbig

“Yep,” and gave Ofﬁcer Anderson his driver’s license.

Moreover, Ofﬁcer Herbig testiﬁed

the license that he

uncommon”
as they

“Do you have ID on you

(TL, p.42, Ls.5-9.) Rather, Ofﬁcer Herbig asked Anderson,

it.

at that point 0r

to

Anderson had refused

d0

so,

and

that

it

t0

was “not

continue [the] conversation as long

and then walk away.” (TL, p.13, L.22 —

p. 14, L.10.)

court therefore correctly found that Anderson’s voluntary act of giving

m

his driver’s license did not convert the consensual encounter into a seizure.

p.46, Ls.3-7.) “[R]equesting identiﬁcation does not, Without more, constitute a seizure.”

Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d 454, 457 (2004); United States

V.

(T12,

Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,

201 (2002) (“Even when law enforcement ofﬁcers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they

may

pose questions, ask for identiﬁcation, and request consent to search

luggage—provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.”). The

fact that

Ofﬁcer

Herbig held Anderson’s license for 29 seconds While he ran a warrants check would only be
sufﬁcient to transform the contact into a seizure if a reasonable person

would not

feel free t0

“terminate the encounter.” Li. Anderson could have easily asked for his license back; that he did

mean he was

not d0 so does not

most

citizens will

seized.1

E

INS

V.

Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (“While

respond t0 a police request, the fact that people do

so,

and d0 so without being

told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature 0f the response.”).

On

appeal,

Anderson

fails t0

show

that the district court erred in concluding that “the

entire encounter,” including the license exchange,

was consensual. (TL,

p.46, Ls.3-7.)

Anderson

argues that individuals are invariably seized “upon surrendering” their driver’s license t0 law

enforcement.

But

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

Supreme Court

set forth in

Egg:

this

unforgiving standard ignores What the Idaho

that “[i]nterrogating a person concerning his identiﬁcation 0r

requesting identiﬁcation does not, without more, constitute a seizure.”

P.3d

at

was a

457 (emphasis added). Given

that this consensual encounter

“friendly conversation” with an ofﬁcer

could possibly be”

(Tr,. p.41,

who “was

Ls.16-20)—Anderson

140 Idaho

at

844, 103

had nothing “more”

to it—it

about as far away from demanding as

fails t0

show

that the

mere request

for

identiﬁcation created a seizure.

Anderson additionally argues

that the State

“conceded” below that “Mr. Anderson was

not free t0 disregard the ofﬁcer’s request but was required by statute t0 surrender his license t0
the ofﬁcer,” thus converting the consensual encounter into a detention. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9

(citing T12, p.33, Ls.18—25).)

1

The

state

does occur
Idaho

at

recognizes the

Egg

when an ofﬁcer

Court noted

its

prior decisions holding that “a limited detention

paperwork of value.” Egg, 140
omitted). In Egg, however, the ofﬁcer retained Page’s

retains a driver’s license or other

844, 103 P.3d at 457 (citations

identiﬁcation and returned to his patrol car t0 run a warrants check,

Q

at 843,

103 P.3d at 456,

Q

and the Court held Page was improperly detained once his license was retained,
at 845, 103
at 458. Unlike Egg, Ofﬁcer Herbig did not take Anderson’s license and return to his patrol
car.
Rather, he held Anderson’s license for 29 seconds while Anderson chatted With him at

P.3d

arm’s length.

The

state

submits

that,

0n these

facts,

any retention 0f Anderson’s license was

insufﬁcient to convert the consensual encounter into a detention.

This

is

argued that the

The prosecutor did not concede

mistaken.

district court

The law does

that there

was a

detention; rather, he

could have concluded there was a detention:

state that

When an ofﬁcer makes an

otherwise legal contact With a

driver of a vehicle, they’re permitted t0 ask for the driver’s license and the vehicle

documents,

at least

under 49-3 16.

So while we do have Ofﬁcer Herbig here
have t0 recognize

initiating a

consensual encounter,

I

d0

under the case law, the Court could determine that the
defendant was obligated to give Ofﬁcer Herbig his driver’s license, and that While

that
that

that

was happening, the Court could conclude and
the defendant was detained at that point.

However,

I

think [Godwin] and [Landreth]

29 seconds,

detention, albeit for

the law

may

support the fact

make

that detention

it clear that even if there was a
was reasonable and supported by

the law.

(TL, p.33, L.14

— p.34, L.4 (emphasis

added).)

Highlighting what the “Court could conclude” or what the “law

“concession”—not even
alternative

(E

close.

argument when

it

Moreover,

it

is

stated “even if there

clear the state

was a

may

support”

was making a prelude

is

t0

not

an

detention,” before discussing the same.

id.)

Arguing

in the alternative is not

“concessions” that

it

never

conceding a point.

made below.

encounter, including the license exchange,

Moreover, the

And

the state

district

is

not bound by

court decided the entire

was consensual, which preserves

this issue for this

Court’s review. State V. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 436 P.3d 683, 689 (2019) (holding issues “argued

t0,

0r decided by, the district court

district court correctly

can form the basis for review by

found the request

encounter, Anderson fails t0

t0 see

this Court”).

Because the

Anderson’s license was part 0f a consensual

show any Fourth Amendment

Violation.

Even If Anderson Was Seized, AnV Brief Detention That Occurred When Ofﬁcer Herbig
Took Anderson’s Driver’s License Was Reasonable And Did Not Violate Anderson’s

D.

Fourth

Even

Amendment Rights

if this

Court concludes Ofﬁcer Herbig’s request t0 see Anderson’s driver’s license

converted the consensual encounter into a detention,

State V.

ﬂ Egg,

140 Idaho

Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493, 826 P.2d 452, 454 (1992),

unlawful seizure.

it

at 844,

103 P.3d at 457;

did not transform

it

an

into

Idaho’s appellate courts have consistently held that the brief retention of a

motorist’s driver’s license or other identifying paperwork during an otherwise lawful police

contact

is

minimal When compared
to properly identify the

to the valid

person with

ofﬁcer safety. Godwin, 121 Idaho

P.3d

at

upon

constitutionally reasonable because the intrusion

at

public/govemmental

whom

he

is

the person’s privacy interest

interests, including the ofﬁcer’s

dealing, prepare accurate reports

493-94, 826 P.2d

at

need

and ensure

454-55; Landreth, 139 Idaho

at

990, 88

1230; State V. Reed, 129 Idaho 503, 505-06, 927 P.2d 893, 895-96 (Ct. App. 1996);

also State V. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 439,

34 P.3d 1119, 1122

have a strong

individuals they

interest

in identifying the

(Ct.

come

is

ﬂ

App. 2001) (“[T]he police
into

contact with in any

capacity”).

For example, in Landreth, the Idaho Court of Appeals held

that,

even absent any

suspicion of criminal activity, an “ofﬁcer could properly detain Landreth to run a driver’s license

check

after a legitimate

in that case

vehicle

was dispatched

139 Idaho

at

to parking space.

The ofﬁcer

991, 88 P.3d at 1231.

t0 a grocery store parking lot in response t0 a report

moving from parking space

arrival, the

the

consensual encounter.”

Li. at 987,

88 P.3d

at

of a suspicious

1227.

Upon

his

ofﬁcer observed the vehicle and observed that an extension cord was running from

hood 0f the vehicle

to the wall

0f the grocery

store.

Li.

The ofﬁcer questioned

the driver 0f

the vehicle, Landreth, about his identity and purpose at the grocery store and also asked

10

him

for

identiﬁcation.

Li.

When

Landreth produced his driver’s license, the ofﬁcer relayed the

“pertinent information” to dispatch and dispatch, in turn, advised the ofﬁcer that Landreth

outstanding arrest warrant.

Li.

The ofﬁcer

arrested Landreth

0n the warrant and,

incident to that arrest, found methamphetamine, marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

Landreth

moved

afﬁrmed.

Li

at

in a search

Li

to suppress the evidence, “claiming that his brief detention While the

ofﬁcer ran a driver’s query violated his Fourth
searches and seizures.”

had an

Li The

district court

Amendment

right t0

be free from unreasonable

denied the motion, and the Idaho Court 0f Appeals

987-91, 88 P.3d at 1227-31.

m,

Citing

supra, the Court of Appeals

recognized “[t]he Idaho Supreme Court has determined that a police ofﬁcer’s brief detention 0f a
driver to run a status check

driver, is reasonable for

P.3d

at

occurs

1230

(citing

0n the

purposes 0f the Fourth Amendment.”

m,

When an ofﬁcer

valid, lawful contact

with the

Landreth, 139 Idaho at 990, 88

121 Idaho at 495, 826 P.2d at 456.)

Although a limited seizure

takes a motorist’s license, “substantial public interests, including the

ofﬁcer’s need t0 positively identify the person with

minimal police intrusion.”
Moreover, “the Idaho

making a

driver’s license, after

M,

Li. (citing

statute authorizing ofﬁcers to

3 16, includes the authority to run a status

whom

he

[is]

dealing, outweigh[] the

121 Idaho at 495-96, 826 P.2d at 456-57).

demand

display 0f a driver’s license, I.C. 49-

check 0n the license.”

Li. (citing

m,

121 Idaho at

495-96, 826 P.2d at 456-57).

Applying

when

M,

the Court of Appeals concluded Landreth

was not unlawfully detained

the ofﬁcer took his driver’s license and ran his information through dispatch.

was already stopped

in the parking lot

and willingly spoke with the ofﬁcer,” Which meant the

contact to the point the ofﬁcer took Landreth’s driver’s license

encounter.

“Landreth

Landreth, 139 Idaho at 991, 88 P.3d at 1231.
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was a

valid,

consensual

Because, under Godwin, “an ofﬁcer’s

brief detention 0f a driver t0 run a status check

lawful contact with the driver,

on the

driver’s license, after

reasonable for purposes 0f the Fourth

is

making a

Amendment,”

valid,

the Court

0f Appeals held the brief detention of Landreth t0 run a status check 0n his driver’s license was
constitutionally reasonable.

countenance ofﬁcers

In so holding, the Court cautioned

Li.

initiating ‘consensual contacts’

make

in Landreth’s case,

decision did “not

with individuals merely in order t0 follow

that contact With a request for identiﬁcation t0 run a license

was not a concern

its

check 0r a warrants check.”

Li.

This

however, because “the ofﬁcer had a legitimate reason t0

contact with Landreth, even though that reason

may

not have amounted to reasonable

suspicion that would have justiﬁed a detention at the outset of the encounter.” Li.

Landreth controls the outcome here. Like the ofﬁcer in Landreth, Ofﬁcer Herbig made a
valid, lawful contact

(T12, p.40,

with Anderson,

L.16 — p.41, L.18.)

And

who was

already stopped and willingly spoke with him.

like the

encounter in Landreth, the interaction between

Ofﬁcer Herbig was consensual and not a detention. (TL, p.46, Ls.3-9). Ofﬁcer Herbig asked for
Anderson’s identiﬁcation so that he could “identify

Which

is

a “substantial public interest[]” recognized

Moreover, there

is

n0 information

in the

who

[he]

by Idaho

was

talking to” (TL, p.13, L.14),

courts. Li. at 990, 88

P.3d

at

1230.

record that shows Ofﬁcer Herbig initiated the

consensual contact with Anderson “merely in order t0 follow that contact with a request for
identiﬁcation t0 run a license check or a warrants check.” Landreth, 139 Idaho at 991, 88 P.3d at

There

1231 (emphasis added).
record

is

clear

that

is

likewise no evidence to support Anderson’s claim that “the

he detained Mr. Anderson solely for the purpose 0f obtaining his

identiﬁcation and running

it

through police dispatch.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.12.)

Because the ofﬁcer made consensual contact With Anderson, and because there’s n0
indication he contacted

Anderson “merely

in order” to request his driver’s license, this

12

was a

“valid, lawful” contact. Landreth,

0f Anderson to “run a

Amendment.

status

139 Idaho

at

991, 88 P.3d at 123

1.

Thus, the “brief detention”

check on the driver’s license” was reasonable under the Fourth

Li.

Recognizing the need to distinguish

M

and Landreth, Anderson argues those cases

involved license checks “tethered t0 the valid trafﬁc stop” 0r following some “‘legitimate reason’

m

for initiating the contact.”

narrow; the

(Appellant’s brief, p.13.)

Court did not hold that a valid traﬁc stop

lawful contact” precede the license request.

claim

is

reason” t0 “suspicious circumstances.”
activity in the parking lot”

ofﬁcer contact there).)

(E

N0

the latter

to equate “legitimate

“may not have amounted

139 Idaho

at

that

t0 reasonable suspicion,” but

991, 88 P.3d at 1231.

an

need

Moreover, the Court made

it

be the legitimate backdrop for the stop—its

consensual encounter.” Li.

fact that there

is

And

“initial,

that “the ofﬁcer could properly detain Landreth t0 run a driver’s license

after a legitimate

moment. There

an

The Landreth Court speciﬁcally held

crystal clear that the consensual contact itself could

So the

Anderson appears

that

incorrectly

Appellant’s brief, p.13 (citing the “suspicious

This cannot be correct.

only be a “legitimate reason.”

check

required—only

is

and “possible suspected theft” in Landreth as the justiﬁcation for the

ofﬁcer’s justiﬁcation for the contact

was

is

121 Idaho at 495, 826 P.2d at 456.

technically correct, but incorrectly applied.

explicit holding

The former contention

no dispute

was n0
that

trafﬁc stop here, and

n0 suspicious circumstances,

is

of n0

Ofﬁcer Herbig made lawful consensual contact With Anderson.

evidence shows that the ofﬁcer contacted Anderson in order to check for his license or that

the ofﬁcer

was otherwise

valid, lawful contact

acting unreasonably under the circumstances.

Because there was a

With Anderson preceding the request for his license,

this case falls squarely

13

within

m

and Landreth, and any brief detention was reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. Anderson
Finally,

unlawful,

fails to

Anderson

would

fails to

control the

as the tighter standards

show

otherwise.

show

outcome

that

here.

Cohaganz 0r Egg, where a license request was found

Cohagan and

found in those cases apply

Egg are readily distinguishable, insofar

t0 ofﬁcer encounters

with pedestrians—not

drivers.

The Idaho Supreme Court made
“walking

down

driver’s license.

In

Egg,

the defendant

roadway” when ofﬁcers approached him and asked

the middle 0f a

140 Idaho

this distinction explicit.

at 842,

103 P.3d

at

455. The Court concluded that

was

for his

M—Where

ofﬁcers stopped a driver—did not “lend support t0 the legality 0f the seizure 0f Page’s driver’s
license.” Li. at 845, 103 P.3d at 458.

The

Egg

Court went 0n to explain that “the Court in Godwin was heavily inﬂuenced by

the fact that LC. § 49-3 16 requires a driver to surrender a driver’s license t0 a police ofﬁcer

demand and
little if

that ‘[t]he statutory authority for police to

demand

the police could not check the validity of the license.”

454, 458.

The Court went 0n

t0

ﬁnd

a driver’s license

would mean

140 Idaho 841, 845, 103 P.3d

that “[n]0 equally compelling policy 0r statutory authority

can be cited in the case of seizing a license from a pedestrian.” Li (emphasis added).
Court admonished the

state for

upon

And

the

not “distinguish[ing] the policy differences between taking a

driver’s licensefrom the operator

ofan automobile, and taking anyform ofidentiﬁcationfrom a

pedestrian.”

After reiterating that a license request “must be reasonable

(emphasis added).

under the circumstances” (Which meant that ofﬁcers naturally did not have “unfettered discretion

2

State V.

Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 404 P.3d 659 (2017).
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t0 stop drivers

and request a display 0f a driver’s

license”), the

Court concluded that the seizure

0f Page was unreasonable:
In this case, the totality of the circumstances presented t0

Ofﬁcer Marshall

showed n0 compelling need to seize the identiﬁcation and conduct a warrants
check; nor were there facts present that legitimized the detention 0f Page once the
ofﬁcer determined, pursuant t0 his community caretaker ﬁmction, that Page was
not in need of assistance. Appellant has also not demonstrated a particularized or
objective justiﬁcation for detaining Page. This Court

is

concerned about the

implications of a rule allowing law enforcement ofﬁcers the ability to initiate

consensual encounters with pedestrians in order to seize identiﬁcation and run a
warrants check.

Li.

(emphasis added).
In Cohagan, the Idaho

Supreme Court

reiterated that

Page dealt With “the

illegality

of

seizing identiﬁcation belonging to a pedestrian not suspected 0f criminal conduct”:

[In

Page] [W]e held that there was “[n]0 equally compelling policy or statutory

authority” that

would support

seizure 0f a driver’s license from a pedestrian.

We

then took note 0f our statement in Godwin “that ‘police ofﬁcers d0 not have
unfettered discretion t0 stop drivers and request a display 0f a driver’s license’ to

conduct a random status and/or warrants check.” Most signiﬁcantly, we expressed
concern “about the implications of a rule allowing law enforcement ofﬁcers the
ability to

initiate

consensual encounters with pedestrians in order t0 seize

identiﬁcation and run a warrants check.”

162 Idaho

at

725, 404 P.3d at 667 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added).

None of these concerns
seat

0f his car there

driver’s license.

E

is

Godwin, 121 Idaho

at

at

sitting in the driver’s

496, 826 P.2d at 457. Anderson was already stopped

in a pleasant, consensual conversation,

was randomly “stop[ping]

Cohagan, 162 Idaho

Because Anderson was

a substantial public interest in allowing the ofﬁcer to brieﬂy see his

and was engaging the ofﬁcer
the ofﬁcer

are applicable here.

and there

is

n0 evidence

that

drivers” in a display 0f unfettered discretion gone Wild.

725, 404 P.3d at 667.

And any

15

concerns the Cohagan Court had about

“the ability to initiate consensual encounters with pedestrians” (Q), are simply inapplicable

here—Anderson was not a pedestrian.
Thus, this case

is

controlled

by Godwin and Landreth. Ofﬁcer Herbig had a

consensual contact With Anderson preceding the request to see the license.
detention 0f a driver t0 run a status check 0n the driver’s license, after

contact With the driver,

Godwin, 121 Idaho

at

is

reasonable for purposes 0f the Fourth

Anderson

fails to

show

Amendment

And

making a

a “brief

valid, lawful

Amendment”—ﬁ111

stop.

Because the request t0 see the license was

495, 826 P.2d at 456.

reasonable under the Fourth

legitimate,

there

was n0

Constitutional Violation here, and

otherwise.

CONCLUSION
The
motion

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s denial

to suppress evidence.

DATED this 6th day 0f February, 2020.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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0f Anderson’s

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IHEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day 0f February, 2020, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means 0f iCourt
File

and Serve:

KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

KDG/dd
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